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Abstract
Let L be any finite distributive lattice and B be any boolean predicate defined on L such that the
set of elements satisfying B is a sublattice of L. Consider any subset M of L of size k of elements of L
that satisfy B. Then, we show that k generalized median elements generated from M also satisfy B. We
call this result generalized median theorem on finite distributive lattices. When this result is applied
to the stable matching, we get Teo and Sethuraman’s median stable matching theorem. Our proof is
much simpler than that of Teo and Sethuraman. When the generalized median theorem is applied to the
assignment problem, we get an analogous result for market clearing price vectors.
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1 Introduction
The Stable Matching Problem (SMP) [4] has wide applications in economics, distributed computing, resource
allocation and many other fields [9, 11] with multiple books and survey articles [8–10,12]. In the standard
SMP, there are n men, m1,m2, . . . ,mn, and n women, w1, w2, . . . , wn, each with their totally ordered
preference list. The goal is to find a matching between men and women such that there is no blocking pair.
A pair of a man and a woman is a blocking pair for a matching if they are not married to each other but
prefer each other over their partners in that matching. Teo and Sethuraman [13] have shown the following
result called generalized median stable matching theorem.
Theorem 1. [13] Let M1,M2, ...,Mk be k distinct stable marriage solutions. Each man mi has k possible
mates under these matchings. Assign him the woman whose rank is j among the k (possibly nondistinct)
women. Then, this assignment gives rise to another, not necessarily distinct, stable marriage solution.
Their proof uses properties of fractional stable marriages. In this paper, we prove a generalized median
theorem on finite distributive lattices. When this result is applied to the stable matching, we get Teo and
Sethuraman’s median stable matching theorem. Not only our proof is much simpler than [13], but is also
more general because it is applicable to any problem for which the set of solutions form a finite distributive
lattice. For example, the theorem is applicable to constrained stable matchings [6] such as stable marriages
in which regret of man mi is at most that of mj , or stable marriages with forbidden pairs. When the
generalized median theorem is applied to the market clearing price vectors [3], we get an analogous result
for market clearing prices.
2 Generalized Median Feasible elements
Let L be any finite distributive lattice. Let B be any boolean predicate defined on L. B is called a regular
predicate if the set of elements of L that satisfy B form a sublattice of L [7].
In the context of the stable matching problem, we define L as the set of all assignment vectors G of size
n such that each component of the vector is a number from 0 to n− 1. The interpretation of G[i] = j is
that man mi is assigned his choice j as his spouse. The choice 0 corresponds to the top choice and the
choice n − 1 corresponds to the least preferred choice. The order defined on L is natural. For any two
assignment vectors G and H,
G ≤ H ≡ ∀i : G[i] ≤ H[i]
In other words, an assignment G is less than or equal to H iff every man gets at least as good a choice in G
as in H.
Note that an assignment may not even be a matching if multiple men are assigned the same woman. We
now define the predicate B on L. An assignment vector G satisfies B if it is a stable marriage. Formally, G
satisfies B if
1. G is a matching, i.e., all men are assigned different woman, and
2. There is no blocking pair in G. A pair of man and woman (m,w) is blocking if they are not matched
and they prefer each other over their assignment in G.
It is well-known that the set of elements of L that satisfy B form a sublattice of L, i.e., if G and H are
stable marriages, then so are G unionsqH and G uH where unionsq and u are the join and the meet operation in the
lattice L. This result is stated by Knuth [10] and attributed to Conway.
Going back to our general set-up, we have a finite distributive lattice L and a regular predicate B
defined on L. Let M be any set of elements in L that satisfy B. We now present the general median
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theorem on finite distributive lattices. Before we present the theorem, we need to define the notation G[i]
for any element G in a general finite distributive lattice L. Let J(L) denote the sub-poset of L consisting
of all the join-irreducible elements of L. Fig. 1(i) shows a distributive lattice L and Fig. 1(ii) shows the
subposet J(L). Consider any chain partition of J(L). Suppose that J(L) has n chains in its partition. In
our example, J(L) is partitioned into two chains. Let H be an order ideal of the poset J(L), i.e., H is a
subset of J(L) such that if y belongs to H and x is less than y, then x is also included in H. It is clear
that H can be equivalently represented as a vector of size n such that H[i] equals the number of elements
of chain i of J(L) included in H. In our example, the order ideal {a, b, c} is represented as the vector
(2, 1) because it contains two elements from the first chain and one element from the second chain. From
Birkhoff’s Theorem on finite distributive lattices [1, 2, 5], there is 1-1 correspondence between order ideals
of the poset J(L) and L. Thus, any element G in L is equivalent to an order ideal H of J(L) and G[i] is
same as H[i] which is simply the number of elements of chain i included in H. Fig. 1(iii) shows the vector
representation of all elements in lattice L. With this notation, we are ready to present the generalized
median theorem for finite distributive lattices.
(i) (ii) (iii)
c = (0, 1)
d
b b
abcd = (2, 2)
ca
a c
d
L : J(L) :
cd = (0, 2)ac = (1, 1)
a = (1, 0)
acd = (1, 2)abc = (2, 1)
∅ = (0, 0)
Figure 1: (i) A finite distributive lattice L (ii) poset J(L) (iii) Viewing L as order ideals of J(L)
Theorem 2. Let L be any finite distributive lattice. Let B be any boolean predicate defined on L such that
B is regular. Let M = {M1,M2, . . . ,Mk} be any subset of L of size k such that all elements of M satisfy B.
Then, for each index r, we get a multiset {Mi[r] | 1 ≤ i ≤ k}. For any j, we construct the general j-median
state, Gj as follows. For any r, Gj [r] is given by the jth element in the sorted multiset {Mi[r] | 1 ≤ i ≤ k}.
Then, Gj also satisfies B.
Before, we give the proof, we illustrate the theorem on an example. Consider the lattice L in Fig. 1.
Suppose that we are given M = {(1, 0), (0, 1), (0, 2)} such that all three elements in M satisfy B. When we
sort the first index, we get the multiset {0, 0, 1}, and when we sort the second index, we get the multiset
{0, 1, 2}. By using respective components, the median elements generated from M are {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 2)}.
Theorem claims that the median elements also satisfy B. It is easy to verify that the claim is true for this
example. The element (0, 0) satisfies B because both (1, 0) and (0, 1) satisfy B which is closed under meets.
The element (1, 2) satisfies B because both (1, 0) and (0, 2) satisfy B which is also closed under joins.
Observe that k = 1, then Theorem 2 is trivially true for any predicate B. When k = 2, it is true iff B is
regular because the generalized medians correspond to the meet and the join of two elements. Theorem 2
works for any k.
We now give the proof.
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Proof. Without loss of generality, we can assume that Mk is a maximal element in the set M . We use
induction on k. When k equals 1, the theorem holds trivially because G1 and M1 are identical. Suppose
that theorem holds for all values of k less than t. Consider the set M = {Mi | 1 ≤ i ≤ t− 1} ∪ {Mt}. Let
G1, G2, . . . , Gt be median elements of M . We show that they satisfy B. We have two cases.
Case 1: First suppose that Mt ≥Mi for all i < t.
In this case, the assertion holds by induction since G1, G2, Gt−1 are the median elements for {Mi | 1 ≤ i ≤
t− 1} and Gt is identical to Mt.
Case 2: Mt is not greater than or equal to Mi for some i < t.
Let P = {Pi | 1 ≤ i < t} be the median elements for {Mi | 1 ≤ i < t}. From the induction hypothesis, we
can assume that all elements in Pi satisfy B. From the definition of the median elements, we know that
Pt−1 ≥ Pi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t− 1. We construct P ′, a set of size t, from P as follows:
P ′ := {P1, P2, . . . , Pt−2, Pt−1 uMt, Pt−1 unionsqMt}.
Since t > 1, we are guaranteed that Pt−1 exists and therefore the construction is valid.
We first claim that the set of median elements for M and P ′ are identical. Let Q be defined as P ∪{Mt}.
It is clear that the median elements of M and Q are identical because P is the set of median elements
of {Mi | 1 ≤ i ≤ t − 1}. We show that the median elements of P ′ and Q are identical. Each of Pi for
1 ≤ i ≤ t− 2 contributes exactly once in the multiset P ′[j] and the multiset Q[j] for any j. Since the last
two elements in P ′ are Pt−1 uMt, Pt−1 unionsqMt, we get that Pt−1 and Mt also contribute exactly once for P ′[j]
and Q[j]. Hence, median elements of P ′ and Q are identical which implies that the median elements of P ′
and M are identical.
We next claim that the median elements of P ′ satisfy B. Since, Pt−1 unionsqMt is greater than or equal to
all elements in P ′, case 1 is applicable and we get that all the median elements of P ′ satisfy B.
By using L as the set of all assignments to men and B as the predicate that the assignment is a stable
marriage, we get the following Teo and Sethurmanan’s result on generalized median stable matching [13].
Corollary 1. Let M = {M1,M2, . . . ,Mk} be any set of stable marriages for any instance of the stable
marriage problem. For any j, if every man is assigned the jth element in the sorted multiset {Mi[m] | 1 ≤
i ≤ k}, then the resulting assignment is a stable marriage.
Moreover, we get the following result on market clearing prices.
Corollary 2. Let M = {M1,M2, . . . ,Mk} be any set of market clearing prices for any instance of the
market clearing prices problem. For any j, if every item is assigned the jth price in the sorted multiset
{Mi[m] | 1 ≤ i ≤ k}, then the resulting price assignment is market clearing.
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